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ILLINOIS v. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A long list might be formed of the demonstrable blunders with regard to its questions made by eminent men, blunders which they
themselves have been sometimes the first to acknowledge; and
there are few lawyers of any practice in drawing wills and settlements who have not at some time either fallen into the net which
the Rule spreads for the unwary, or at least shuddered to think
how narrowly they have escaped it.1
THE COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
From its inception, the Rule has provoked havoc to innumerable testamentary dispositions. Much has been suggested and
many attempts have been made to alleviate some of the disastrous results of the Rule. It is the purpose of this comment to
discuss one such attempt: the recently enacted Illinois Statute
Concerning Perpetuities.
History of the Rule
The reasons for the Rule Against Perpetuities are somewhat obscure as are most of the property principles found in
Anglo-American common law. No necessity for restrictions
upon the creation of future interests existed prior to the Statute
of Uses and Wills since future interests as such were rarely
used. Terms for years to begin in the future and shifting or
springing executory interests were not recognized. 2 As a result
of the above mentioned statutes, recognition was given to these
interests. But problems soon arose. Executory interests were
held to be indestructible,3 the vesting of which could possibly be
postponed indefinitely. For example, testator may devise a tract
of land to A and his heirs so long as the northwest corner not be
used for commercial purposes, but if said corner is used for
such puposes, then to B and his heirs. It is theoretically possible without restrictions or perpetuities, for the land to stay in
A's family for a millennium and then go to the heirs of B as a
result of the corner plot being used for commercial purpose. The
astronomical proportions of transferring the property to B's
heirs after such a lapse of time, understandably aroused the displeasure of the common law courts. Finally, the Duke of Norfolk's Case4 afforded a measure for the period within which
future interests were to vest, thereby establishing a time element to determine the validity of an interest.
The Rule was a safeguard against the taking of property
1J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES at xi (4th ed. 1942).
2 H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

(1941).

9 Pells v. Brown 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
4Duke of Norfoik's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
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out of commerce. It was hoped that the Rule would thereby
insure that property would not be rendered inalienable, thereby
affecting subsequent holders by limiting the free transferability
of the property. The disposition of property made by the present generation would not, it was hoped, affect the desires of
future generations. But the evolutionary process has taken its
toll. The intended panacea has become, as will be shown, a
legal disaster.
Classical Definition
Prior to its recent statutory form, the Rule Against Perpetuities had been adopted by the Illinois courts," using Professor Gray's definition of the Rule as the standard.- This classic definition states that, "No interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."' A corollary of the above is that,
"If by any possibility the interest does not vest within this time,
it comes within the Rule, and the estate attempted to be created
must fail." 9
In his work on perpetuities, Gray states that it is "a well
established simple and clear Rule" and "it has grown to fit the
ordinary dealings of the community."' 0 At first glance, it would
seem Gray's initial description of the Rule is correct. However,
it is well to keep in mind that Gray wrote over 800 pages on
this "simple and clear Rule.""
THE NECESSITY FOR CHANGING THE COMMON LAW RULE

Victims of the Rule
The draftsman bears the initial responsibility of currently
determining the effect of the Rule on the dispositions he is formulating. Normally, only the most experienced practitioner is
able to escape the hazards that have become inherent in the
Rule. This is not to say that the average practitioner is in5 For brief treatments of the Rule, see L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS ch. 23 (2d ed. 1966) ; Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell,
For more extended treatments see J. GRAY,
51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938).
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§§370-403 (1944); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
ch. 39 (2d ed. 1956) ; 5 R. POWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, chs. 71-73
(1968).
6 Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Llewellyn, 67 Ill.App. 2d 171, 214
N.E.2d 471 (1966).
7 Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill. 205, 61 N.E.2d 40 (1945); Wechter v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 385 Ill. 111, 52 N.E.2d 157 (1944) ; McKibben
v. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank, 365 Ill. 369, 6 N.E.2d 619 (1937) ; Keefer
v. McCloy, 344 Ill. 454, 176 N.E. 743 (1931) ; Aldendifer v. Wylie, 306 Il1.
426, 138 N.E. 143 (1923).
8 J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §201 (4th ed. 1942).
9 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Schellaberger, 399 Ill. 320, 333, 77 N.E.2d
675, 683 (1948).
10 J.GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §870 (4th ed. 1942).
11 Id.
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capable of avoiding the perpetuities problem, since the technicalities of the Rule that do trap the less experienced draftsman may
be avoided. It may be that a slight change in the wording of
the instrument is sufficient to prevent an unfavorable application
of the Rule. Consider, for example, the often recurring situation
of a gift of property to A for his life, then to such of A's children
as attain the age of twentyfive. By simply cutting the age contingency so that the gift to A's children becomes dependent upon
reaching the age of twenty-one, the gift no longer violates the
Rule. This, however, offers no consolation to the unwary draftsman who does not possess the skills, derived through experience,
that the Rule demands.
The ultimate victims are the legatees and devisees, who as
a result of the draftsman's inadvertence, innocently fail to receive the property which testator had intended them to receive.
In such a situation, the damage with regard to the draftsman
is not limited to his professional pride. If his workmanship
results in a violation of the Rule, he may become liable to an
intended beneficiary for the amount lost by the beneficiary as a
12
result of the violation.
CRITICISMS OF THE RULE

The Rule has been the brunt of much criticism with legal
scholars and practitioners alike demanding reform. The principal criticisms are primarily directed at the Rule's more absurd
and inequitable results. Although these results do not frequently occur, they are not so rare that they may be delegated
to a position of unimportance.
In the main, the criticisms revolve around the following
problem areas:
1. The Rule is applied according to standard perpetuities
doctrine at the instrument's inception, so that the validity of the
interest must be determined prospectively in the light of then
existing factors. The Rule requires that at the time of the dates
of the instrument it must be certain that the interest will vest
within the period of the Rule. Facts that actually have occurred
since the instrument's creation are deemed irrelevant so that
contingent future interests may be void even though the probability of the interest not vesting within the prescribed period is
remote. It may, in fact, be impossible for the interest not to
vest in time due to factors that have risen shortly after the date
12 Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
(1961). In this case the California Supreme Court held the defendant-attorney not liable for malpractice since errors made in matters involving the
Rule were not uncommon among skilled and capable attorneys. This,
however, avoids the problem and it is entirely possible that other courts,
as did the trial and apellate courts in the instant case, may find liability.
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of the instrument. Nevertheless, under the common law rule,
the interest must be adjudicated void.
Examples of the above, involving perhaps the most highly
criticized aberrations of the Rule, may be categorized into three
general situations:
The first is the problem of an interest that is contingent
upon the probate of a will or some other administrative contingency which typically takes the form of testator devising
certain property to his descendants or to his executor in trust
for the benefit of said descendants, who are living at the time
of the probate of his will.' 3 In such a situation the gift will
therefore not vest in the devisee until the probate of the will
occurs. Courts are not unaware that the probability of the interest not vesting in time is extremely remote. This awareness
was expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in a case involving
a probate contingency where it stated that:
It is clear from the language of the will itself: whatever interest the executor took under it could not vest in him until the probate
of the will, and while this event would, in the ordinary and usual
course of events, probably occur within a few months, or at most
a few years, after the death of testatrix, yet it cannot be said that
happen within twenty-one
it is a condition that must inevitably
1
years from the death of testatrix. "
The existence of a bare possibility of the contingent interest remotely vesting is sufficient to violate the Rule. 15 This possibility
becomes virtually non-existent when the contingency invokes,
as in the example above, the full period of the Rule, namely,
lives in being plus twenty-one years. It therefore becomes
evident that although the high probability of the interest being
valid is acknowledged, the courts have been conspicuously powerless to alleviate the inequitable, arbitrary nature of the Rule.
The second situation involving contingent future interest is
the case of what has become known as the "unborn widow". This
construction results in the invalidity of future interests which
normally would not have violated the Rule. 16
The "unborn widow" doctrine is invoked normally where
testator gives a life estate to a third person, then a life estate
to that person's widow and upon her death a remainder to her
children.
Is In this example and those that remain, it is to be assumed (unless the

contrary is stated) that the gift is by testamentary disposition.
4Johnson v. Preston, 226 Iil. 447, 457, 80 N.E. 1001, 1004 (1907).

Here the contingency involved a provision that devised to testatrix's executor

a certain tract of land, to have and to hold for the term of 25 years from
and after the probate of the will in trust for certain of her grandchildren.
15Id.
16 Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 U.
CHI. L. REv. 488 (1961). See also Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HARv.
L. REv. 638, 644 (1938).
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Such a widow may be a woman born after the death of the testatrix and may live more than twenty-one years, (after her husband's death) so that the limitation to take effect after her death
is void because the contingency on which it depends may not occur within the time prescribed by the rule. The improbability of
its occurrence after the prescribed time is immaterial." 7
Thus the gift over to the children is void. The remarkable
fact is that an actual case of the "unborn widow" has yet to be
documented.18 But the courts have continued to invalidate these
gifts on the premise that it might possibly happen and therefore
the gift must be declared void. The appalling result of this
construction has justly earned the contempt and ridicule of the
legal community.
The third problem area concerns the presumption of the
fertile octogenarian. The theory is that there is a conclusive
presumption of fertility, that is to say that a person, no matter
what age, is presumed to be capable of reproducing. Under the
theory, a woman of ninety is capable of bearing children and a
boy of five has the capacity of becoming a father, in spite of the
fact that medical evidence has shown conclusively that there are,
indeed, limits to man's sexual endurance.
Since Jee v. Audley, 19 where it was held that a woman of
seventy was conclusively presumed to be capable of bearing
children, these fertile octogenarian cases have destroyed sensible
wills and trusts. It is not to be assumed that the theory has become impotent due to the modern presence of well documented
medical evidence. As recently as 1949, an English court ruled
that it was conclusively presumed that a widow of sixty-seven
could have a child and that this child could in turn have a child
before the age of five.20
In the future this theory may create even greater problems.
Under modern scientific methods of artificial insemination, babies
may be born years after the death of their father. 21 The possibilities of this legal dilemma alone should be sufficient to warrant
statutory change in the Rule.
2. The second major criticism of the Rule centers on the
problem of a violating contingency being adjudicated as totally
void, although parts of it may be valid. In instances where the
violating clause is void due to a minor technicality, the contingency will not be rewritten so as to make it valid, although its
Easton v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397, 408, 154 N.E. 216, 219-20 (1926).
Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,
65 HARv. L. Ruv. 721, 731 (1952).
19 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787).
17
18

Re Gaites Will Trusts, 1 All E.R. 459 (1949).
For an interesting discussion of this problem of the "child en ventre
sa frigidaire" see Leach, Perpetuitiesin the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank
and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A.J. 942 (1962).
20
21
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alteration would have no significant effect on testator's intention.
Perhaps the most familiar and often recurring case of
the above is that of age contingencies which are most often found
in gifts to classes.
The common law governing age contingencies, as pertaining
to class gifts, was announced in 1817, in Leake v. Robinson2 2 and
has remained relatively unchanged in jurisdictions that apply
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, including Illinois2
In that case, property was given to the grandson of testator for
his life, with a remainder to such of his children as should attain
the age of twenty-five, followed by a gift over to his brothers
and sisters who should attain the age of twenty-five on the condition that testator's grandson should either die without issue
or have no issue who attain that age. The grandson died without
issue leaving eight brothers and sisters surviving him, three of
whom were born after testator's death. The English court held
that the gift to the brothers and sisters was contingent upon the
donees reaching the age of twenty-five and that this class of
donees included all of the brothers and sisters of the grandson.
Since the gift, according to the court, was not confined to the
brothers and sisters living at testator's death, the fact that one
of the grandchildren born after testator's death and therefore
not a life in being, might not reach the age of twenty-five within
the time limits set by the Rule, necessitates the failure of the
entire gift.
Under the rule of Leake v. Robinson, every class gift, therefore, fails if it is limited to take effect on members of the class
attaining an age that is in excess of twenty-one years, unless
the class is restricted to those members who are in esse when the
24
gift is made.
The most typical example of an age contingency that violates the Rule is the frequent gift of a life estate to A, remainder
to such of his children as reach the age of twenty-five. This
gift under the common law rule, as interpreted in Leake v. Robinson, is totally void, since A may have a child who was not alive
at testator's death and was less than four years old at A's
death. It is irrelevant if all of A's children, at the time of his
Eng. Rep. 979 (1817).
Thomas v. Pullman Trust & Say. Bank, 371 Ill. 577, 21 N.E.2d 897

2235

23

(1939); Howe v. Hodge, 152 Ill. 252, 38 N.E. 1083 (1894).

See also Mc-

Kibben v. Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank, 365 Ill. 369, 6 N.E.2d 619 (1937),
which decision the court attempts to explain in the Thomas case.
24Aldendifer v. Wylie 306 Ill. 426, 138 N.E. 143 (1923); Moroney v.
Haas, 277 Ill. 467 115 N.E. 648 (1917); Dime Say. & Trust Co. v. Watson,
254 Ill. 419, 98 N.h. 777 (1912) ; Pitzel v. Schneider, 216 Ill. 87, 74 N.E. 779
(1905); Schuknecht v. Schultz, 212 Ill. 43, 72 N.E. 37 (1904); Eldred v.
Meek, 183 Ill. 26, 55 N.E. 536 (1899); Lawrence v. Smith, 163 I1. 149, 45
N.E. 259 (1896).
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death, are actually over the age of four. The mere possibility at
the time of the devise, that a child born to A may be less than
four, is sufficient to negate the gift.
A suggested solution to the above situation is the "second
look" doctrine,2 5 which aims at the determination of the validity
of a contingent interest on the basis of events that actually happen. Under this doctrine, the validity of the interest would be
determined on the basis of facts existing at the termination of
the life estates or lives in being. Thus it is hoped that facts
occurring within the lives in being will result in validating the
gift. The "second look" doctrine would be effective in saving
the gift of the example above, where all the children of A are
over four at his death. But if a child of A, born after testator's
death, is less than four at the death of A, "second look" will
not save the gift.
"Second look" is a variant of the "wait and see" principle
which states that an interest is not invalidated at the time of
its creation; the court must wait and see whether the interest
in fact vests within the period of the Rule, before the occurrence
of the invalidating condition. The court therefore waits until
actual events happen that validate the gift or until it becomes
apparent that the interest cannot vest in time. In effect, then,
there is a substitution, under this principle, of actual events for
26
possibilities in determining the validity of interests.
This approach does overcome to a degree the criticism that
possibilities at the time of the interest's creation, which do not
actually take place, should not destroy what would otherwise
have been a valid gift. But there is one rather significant drawback to the principle: the determination of the validity of all
limitations may possibly be delayed until the expiration of substantially all of the period allowed under the rule. Consider,
for example, the situation where a trustee has been distributing
out of the trust to certain beneficiaries for a considerable length
of time. Ultimately, it is determined, using "wait and see" that
the trust is void for remoteness. The result may very well be
that the trustee has been distributing funds to the wrong people.
It would be little consolation to the surcharged trustee that the
"wait and see" principle avoided one of the inequities of the
Rule Against Perpetuities.
3. The next major criticism deals with the possibilities of
25 Sears v. Coolidge 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952); Minot v.
Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918) ; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§§24.35 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). Statutes that have in some degree enacted
the doctrine are: MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 184A, §1 (1954); CONN. GEN STAT.
§§45-95 (Rev. 1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §101 (1964).
26 This principle has been adopted by Pennsylvania.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, §301.4 (1947).
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reverter and rights of re-entry for breach of condition. These
two interests are said to be exceptions to the Rule, although their
result may be as objectionable as those contingent interests that
are held within the Rule. Although the statutory limitations on
the period of these interests, that have been enacted in a number
of states, notably Illinois, 27 have taken some of the sting out of
their result, their continuing existence as exceptions are inconsistent and illogical. This may be illustrated in the following
examples: testator devised to X school, land in fee simple, so
long as said land is used for a playground. Testator's heirs
have a possibility of reverter, which is regarded as vested and
therefore not subject to the Rule. But if testator had devised
this land to X school in fee simple and added that if the land
ceased to be used as a playground, then to Y in fee, Y's executory interest being subject to the Rule, would be void for remoteness, since it is possible for Y's interest not to vest within
a life in being plus twenty-one years. Objectively, there is no
logical reason why the possibility of reverter of the heirs is
valid and the executory interest in Y is void. They both defeat
the avowed purpose of the Rule since they equally tend to tie up
property by hindering the property's alienability.
4. The fourth criticism deals with the concept of vesting
under the Rule. As shown in situations involving possibilities
of reverter and rights of re-entry, some vested interests may tie
up property as long as contingent ones. In limiting the Rule to
contingent interests, the very purpose of a modern Rule Against
Perpetuities is frustrated. As a result, the control of descendants'
estates is possible from the grave by the use of vested interests.
Their result would be severely limited if said interests were
held within the Rule as are contingent ones. The conclusion
that the exemption of vested interests from the Rule should
be eliminated seems both persuasive and reasonable.
To avoid this problem of vesting, it has been argued that
the common law rule as such should be abolished and a rule
against remoteness of possession be enacted. The period of
the Rule would remain the same; the only basic difference between the two forms would be that the question would not be
one of whether the interest will or will not vest within the
prescribed period but would become one of possession within the
period. Vested interests would come under the same scrutiny
as contingent interests, since the validity would be determined
in the light of their coming into possession and not their vesting
in time. With such an alteration, the free marketability of title,
27 ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 30, §37e (1969) which limits the length of possibilities of reverter and right of re-entry to forty years from the date of their

creation.
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one of the main purposes of the common law rule, could be
more jealously and effectively guarded.
It is obvious that the common law Rule Against Perpetuities
demands reform making statutory modification essential to
bring the Rule out of its medieval concepts.
ILLINOIS STATUTE CONCERNING PERPETuITIES

The Illinois General Assembly enacted, in September of
1969, a "Statute Concerning Perpetuities. ' ' 28 This was the first
time in the State's history that the Illinois legislature had directly addressed itself to the Rule Against Perpetuities. It was
obviously their intention to modify the common law rule so
that the inequitable results that had, prior to the statute, run
rampant through property law, be erased for present and future
generations. Their success can only be determined by the passage of time, but the prospects, as will be shown, are, at best,
mixed.
Sections 191 and 19329 respectively, deal with title and the
definitions of some of the terms used. Section 192, in stating
the purpose of the statute, makes it clear that this Act merely
modifies the common law rule and that the common law rule
"shall remain in full force and effect. ' 30 It is therefore evident
from the onset that the problems involved with the concept
of vesting are not changed by the statute.
In Section 194 (a) ,," the Act codifies the situations where the
Rule is not to be applied. It encompasses leases to commence in
the future, options and powers of a trustee with relation to
distribution and allocation of income and principal.
It is important to note that Section 194 (a) (1)32 in effect
states that the statute applies only to situations where there has
been a violation of the Rule. In other words, where no violation
exists, the modifications enacted may not alter terms of a gift,
even if the change would have provided for a more equitable
result. At a minimum this means that the courts and practitioners must still grapple with the workings of the Rule, since
one must understand a principle before determining whether or
not it has been violated. Fully understanding the Rule Against
Perpetuities remains, therefore, an almost impossible prerequisite
in applying the statute. This section also lends greater significance to a court's determination in extremely complex cases, of
whether there has been a violation, since an application of the
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, §§191-96 (1969).
Id. §§191, 193.
30 Id. §192.
81 Id. §194 (a).
28
29

32Id.

§194(a) (1).
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statute in such a situation may result in the complete alteration
of the gift's direction and of testator's intention.
Illinois' "solutions" to the criticisms of the Rule are, in the
main, enacted in Section 194 (c) ,3 beginning with a declaration of the presumption "that the interest was intended to be
valid," 34 which is to be used in the determination of whether
an interest violates the Rule.
Under the common law interpretation, in looking at the
gifts created by the instrument, one had to first make the determination of whether the slightest possibility existed that a gift
violated the Rule. Therefore, under the common law, the possibilities were to be approached with pessimism and were not
considered in terms of optimism. This attitude has resulted in
the all too frequent declaration of invalidity of perfectly reasonable and sensible gifts. The statute's presumption of an intention, on the part of the testator to create valid gifts, offers
a new approach to the determination of an interest's validity.
Instead of searching for unlikely possibilities, the approach is
initiated from a more optimistic point. The precise location
of this point, however, is unclear. The section does not elaborate on the extent of the presumption and will ultimately therefore depend upon court interpretation. If one assumes that testator had no intention of violating the Rule, that he in fact intended
the gift to be valid, it is reasonable to adopt the construction of
the gift that would avoid invalidity. The remote possibilities
would not be considered since testator had intended the valid
construction. This is not to say that the existence of a distinct
and probable possibility of the interest being remote, will not be
considered. In such a case, the presumption of validity would
be overcome, but remote possibilities would not effect the existence of a valid construction. If this valid construction could
reasonably be adopted, what would normally have been adjudicated remote due to unlikely possibilities, could be declared valid.
Whether the courts will effect such an interpretation is, at this
point, mere conjecture, but if it were adopted, the mortality rate
of gifts caught in the Rule's technical web, would probably be
significantly diminished.
The presumption could go further than "wait and see" and,
if it did, it would provide a solution to the problems of the
doctrine. A court would not have to wait to discover whether
the interest would vest in time. If the construction is reasonable and the possibilities of the interest being remote are unlikely, the gift could be given immediate validity. Whether the
34
84

ld. §194
Id.
§194 (c).
(c) (1) (A).

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

396

[Vol. 3:386

gift actually does vest remotely is irrelevant. The tables would
be turned, since under the common law rule the fact that it
became obvious by subsequent occurrences, that the interest
would indeed vest within the period of the Rule, had no materiality to the interest being held void. Under the proposed
interpretation, reason would be the cornerstone of the Rule,
thereby alleviating the courts from the necessity of using
strained constructions in saving gifts from the Rule.
Section 194(c) (1) (B) 3 5 deals with the interests that are
conditioned on the probate of a will and other administrative
contingencies. As previously discussed, the courts have acknowledged the extremely high probability that the interest
would vest within the period of the Rule, but have not lent
validity to such a contingency. Whatever interpretation is given
to the general presumption of validity, the legislature has expressly stated in this section that an administrative "contingency must occur, if at all, within the period of the rule against
,so Ordinarily, under the common law rule, a
perpetuities ....
devise to certain individuals, who are alive at the time of the
probate of testator's will, would be regarded as void since it
was felt that there was a possibility that the interest would vest
remotely. With the presumption afforded by the section, such
a devise would be valid.
However, the section does present a problem due to its lack
of defining an administrative contingency. If, for example, testator devised to A in trust certain realty, for the benefit of his
descendants living when the mortgage on said realty is paid in
full, the mortgage, in a situation where it is quite high, may,
according to its terms, take upwards of eighty years or longer
to discharge. There exists a high probability that this administrative contingency will not vest within the allowed period but
would, nevertheless, be regarded as valid under the statute.
Thus, testator could accomplish what the Rule is specifically set
up to prevent: the taking of property out of commerce and rendering it inalienable.
The problem of the "unborn widow" is effectively solved by
As previously discussed, ultimate gifts
Section 194 (c) (1) (C).
conditioned upon the survival of a life tenant's widow were regarded as invalid under the common law rule, since the widow
may not have been born at the time of testator's death and therefore was not a life in being.
Under the statute, a presumption arises,
[w]here the instrument creates an interest in the "widow," "wid85Id. §194(c) (1) (B).
86

Id.

87Id.

§194(c) (1) (C).
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ower," or "spouse" of another person, that the maker of the instrument intended to refer to a person who was living at the date
that the period of the rule against perpetuities commences to run.38
Thus, if the life tenant was married at the date of testator's
death, his wife at that time was meant to be the receiver of the
donor's generosity. If she predeceased him, or if he was not
married at the time, the gift conditioned on surviving the widow
would become vested in possession at the death of the life tenant,
since no widow existed for the purpose of the section to take
her life interest. Therefore, whether the widow is unborn or
not, the gift over is valid. As a result of this section, the unreasonable result of the "unborn widow" doctrine under the
common law rule will no longer plague reasonable testamentary
dispositions.
Section 194(c) (2) 9 aims to cut gifts down to size, instead
of invalidating them, where the violation of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is the result of an age contingency. Under the
common law as discussed earlier, the gift to A for life, remainder to such of his children as reach the age of twenty-five,
the gift to said children was totally void since a child of A may
be less than four at A's death resulting in the children's interest
vesting later than the prescribed period. This section would
come into operation here by reducing the age limitation to
twenty-one for all the children and would thereby validate the
entire gift. Thus,
[w]here any interest.., would be invalid because it is made to depend upon any person attaining or failing to attain an age in excess
of 21 years, the age specified shall be reduced to 21 years as to
every person to whom the age contingency applies.40
Although this section will relieve problems arising from
ordinary, simple dispositions as the one above, it is not to be
considered as a panacea for all the ills of age contingencies
under the Rule. Consider the example of a gift to A for his life,
remainder to such of his children as attain the age of twenty-five,
but if no child attains twenty-five, then to X. A has one child,
who was born after testator, but dies at the age of nineteen,
ten years after the death of A. Under common law the interest
of X would be invalid because it is contingent upon a person
failing to attain an age that is in excess of twenty-one years,
which may occur beyond the period of the Rule.
Applying Section 194 (c) (2)41 to the example, the age contingency must be reduced to twenty-one which would make the interest of the child divestable since the divesting clause of the gift
88

Id.

89 Id. §194(c) (2).

40 Id.
41 Id.
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over to X becomes valid when the age is cut back to twenty-one.
The property would therefore go to X. But if the child dies at
twenty-two, the gift over to X, though valid, would not divest the
child's interest. In such a situation, testator's intention would
be completely defeated since he did not intend the child to receive
the property unless he attained the age of twenty-five, which
he did not do. Further, testator intended that if the child did
not reach the prescribed age, X was to take it, but that is impossible since the reduced age limitation has been attained. Under
common law, the gift to the child would have been divestable at
whatever the age required. The result of the statute in validating the divesting clause may be that neither X nor the child will
receive the property as testator intended.
The fertile octogenarian construction is found in Section
194 (c) (3) .4 The presumption here is that "no person shall be
deemed capable of having a child until he has attained the age
of 13 years," 43 and that, "any person who has attained the age
of 65 years shall be deemed incapable of having a child ....
The section's effect is to diminish but not eradicate the legal
absurdity that any person is capable of having children. Medical
authorities and surveys agree that a woman of fifty-five may
reasonably be presumed to be incapable of bearing children.4
Although the statute does provide that "evidence shall be admissible as to the incapacity of having a child by a living person
who has attained the age of 65 years,"' ' 6 the legislature displayed
a conspicuous lack of appreciation of the available evidence.
Setting the minimum age of thirteen and the maximum at sixtyfive is a step, but it fails to enact a law which reflects the best
medical evidence to date.
It is to be noted that the statute expressly applies to adopted
children. Since Illinois puts an adopted child on a parity with
a child of the blood, it is to the statute's credit that it states that
"the possibility of having a child or more remote descendant by
adoption shall be disregarded." 7 This presumption is not unrealistic since it is common knowledge that most social agencies

44

discourage adoption by parents over the age of thirty or thirtyfive. Thus the not too frequent problem of a grandparent adopting a grandchild is totally eliminated.
§194(c) (3).
2Id.
4

-- Id. §194 (c) (3) (A).
44Id. §194 (c) (3) (B).
45See LAw REFORM COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT, CMD. No. 18

(1956).

See also City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United States, 74 F.2d 692, 693
(2d Cir. 1935) where the court quoted statistics of the U. S. Department
of Commerce which showed that among the 20,389,873 births in the United
States between the years 1923 and 1932 none were to a woman over 55.
40 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30 §194(c) (3) (C)
(1969).
47 Id. §194(c) (3) (D).
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Perhaps the most significant, if not the most novel, feature
of the Act is the section dealing with trusts.48 This section, in
effect, creates an automatic savings clause in any trust the terms
of which violate the Rule. This means that the trust must terminate, irrespective of its violating terms, within a life in being
plus twenty-one years. Therefore, a trust containing a limitation
that is in violation of the Rule,
[S]hall terminate at the expiration of a period of (A) 21 years
after the death of the last to die of all the beneficiaries of the instrument who were living at the date when the period of the rule
against perpetuities commenced to run or (B) 21 years after that
date if no beneficiary of the instrument was then living, unless
events occur which cause an earlier termination in accordance with
the terms of the instrument and then 48the principal shall be distributed as provided by the instrument.
The extent of the benefit derived from this section can only
be determined by the passage of time, but it may be said that
this automatic savings clause will enable many more beneficiaries to reap the rewards of a trust than before the statute's
enactment. At least, the unwary settlor and the innocent beneficiary will cease being, to an extent, the victims of the Rule
due to an oversight or lack of knowledge on the part of the
draftsman.
This is not to say that savings clauses, that have heretofore
been written into the trust instrument, are insignificant and
unnecessary or that the draftsman need not use utmost care in
avoiding a violation of the Rule. Since "Et]his section applies
only when a trust would violate the rule against perpetuities as
modified by Section 4 and does not apply to any trust which would
have been valid apart from this Act,"' 0 a carefully drawn instrument taking cognizance of the Rule, with an effective well formulated savings clause, would not be subject to the section's
arbitrary plan for distribution at the trust's termination.
One of the distribution provisions of the statute,51 provides,
as will be shown, a very interesting and perhaps unintentional
result. The section's effect is to abolish, to a limited extent,
the doctrine of capture. "Capture is an equitable remedy based
upon the implied intent of the donee when the attempted exercise
' 52
It
of a power of appointment is ineffective or incomplete.
48

Id. §195.
49Id. §195 (a).
50Id.

§195(d) (3))(e).

51 Id. §195 (b).

52 Jones, Consequences of an Ineffective Appointment-Capture, 18 ALA.
L. REV. 229 (1965). The designation of the doctrine as "capture" was made
in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Allen, 307 Mass. 40, 43, 29 N.E.2d 310, 312 (1940),

where the court stated "If a manifestation by the donee of an intent to
capture the appointive property from the original settlement is a valid
"
exercise of the power even though the actual appointment fails ...

(emphasis added).
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occurs when, as a result of being given a general testamentary
power of appointment, the donee assumes the control of the
appointive property. This property is treated due to the donee's
general power as his own, since he has the ability to appoint it
to his own estate if he so chooses. According to the doctrine, the
donee's intention is shown when there is an attempted exercise of the power that is ineffective or incomplete, so that it is
the donee's intent, by the exercise of the power, that it will not
result in the property going to the takers in default of appointment, as provided by the donor's creating instrument, but will
remain as part of and therefore pass through donee's estate.
Prior to the statute's enactment, capture in Illinois was
applied only to a limited extent; i.e., where the donee had mingled
or blended the appointive property with his own. The leading
Illinois case applying capture to a blending situation is Bradford
v. Andrew. 53 The donee in that case blended property that was
subject to the general power of appointment with property
owned by her by placing it all in her residuary estate which
expressly included the subject matter of the power of appointment. As one of the appointees predeceased the donee, the
question of the proper disposition of the appointive property
arose. The court found that, in blending the appointive property
with her own, testatrix showed the intention that the property was to go to her estate rather than the takers in default
upon the contingency that the appointment be ineffective.
In Northern Trust Co. v. Porter,54 the court made it clear
that capture would apply only to situations that involved blending. It felt that if the exercise of the power of appointment was
made in a separate and distinct clause of the will and was not
mingled with the donee's own property there was no blending
and therefore no capture. The appointive property would then
pass to the takers in default provided for by donor's creating
instrument.
Under the standard doctrine of capture, the donee's heirs
would take the appointive property whether or not there was
blending where there was an ineffective exercise of a general
power of appointment. The basis for the standard doctrine is
that most donees, if they bother to exercise a general power at
all, would rather have it pass to their own estates than to the
appointees who may be strangers to them. Illinois courts, not
willing to accept this reasoning completely, applied capture in
cases where the donee's intent could be more easily ascertained
and thereby limited the doctrine's application to situations in308 Ill. 458, 139 N.E. 922 (1923).
4 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938).

53
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volving blending. When blending did occur tJie courts showed
no hesitancy in allowing the property to pass to the heirs of the
donee rather than the beneficiaries in default. Capture was, at
least to a limited extent, the law in Illinois prior to the enactment
of the statute.
Section 5 (b) of the statute states that if a trust which terminates by operation of the statute "was created by the exercise
of a power of appointment ... the principal shall be distributed
to the person who would have received it if the power had not
been exercised. ' ' 55 The result would seem to be that if the donee
violates the Rule in exercising his general power of appointment
in the form of a trust, the takers in default would receive the
property. This would occur despite the fact that the appointive
property had been blended with that of the donee's. Not only
is capture avoided by the statute at the trust's termination by
saving a trust which would otherwise be regarded as an ineffective exercise of donee's power of appointment, capture is
prevented from being applied at its customary point when the
exercise of the power is determined to have violated the Rule.
Thus, in a case where the donee has exercised his general
power by creating a trust that violates the Rule, the statute
would apply and upon the trust's termination, the remaining
property would be distributed to the takers in default of appointment as provided in donor's creating instrument. Even the
mingling of the appointive property with that of the donee's
does not, under the statute, invoke capture. The donee's heirs
will not take under any circumstances. Clearly, to the extent
that a trust is created by an exercise of a power of appointment,
the doctrine of capture has been abolished by this section of the
statute.
CONCLUSION

A fair reading of the cases involving the Rule does not
reasonably affirm Gray's observation regarding the simplicity
and clarity of the Rule. 56 The problems found in situations such
as the "unborn widow",5 7 probate contingencies, 8 age contingencies 59 and the fertile octogenarian construction 0 simply do
not support such an observation. Statutory modification was
needed. The "solutions" proposed and enacted by the Illinois
legislature for the above problems,61 although they evidence a
certain lack of ambition in their cautious modifications, may, to
ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 30, §195(b) (1969).
56 See text at note 10 supra.
57 See text at notes 18, 37 supra.
58 See text at notes 13, 36 supra.
59 See text at notes 22, 39 supra.
60 See text at notes 19, 42 supra.
61 See text at note 33 supra.
55
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a degree, alleviate these problems. But at this stage, it is virtually impossible to predict with a high degree of certainty the end
result of this statute on perpetuity law. Cases involving many
of the problems that have been discussed are not common place
on court dockets. They arise sporadically and few invoke the full
range of the technical complexities that characterize the Rule.
It is therefore quite probable that it may take many years before
the various sections discussed are interpreted by the courts.
Whatever the interpretation, the statute is certain to remedy
many of the most common violations of the Rule in situations
involving rather simple and obvious dispositions. But the Act
does not shed much light in solving problems arising from complex and borderline limitations, and it may, in fact, only confuse
the issues involved in an already confusing field of law.
Problems arising from the concept of vesting have been
completely ignored. 62 The enactment of a new statute is the
most propitious time for correcting previously existing evils.
Certainly the common law Rule Against Perpetuities demanded
extensive revision, yet only the most conspicuous aberrations of
the Rule are dealt with by the statute. This act has solved some
of the traditional problems but not without creating new ones,
such as the one discussed regarding capture.63 Many questions
are still unanswered. Only time will provide the answer as to
which direction the scales will tip.
Edward G. Piwowarczyk

62
63

See text following note 27 supra.
See text at note 55 supra.

